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THE FAIRNESS OF TRIBAL COURT JURIES AND
NON-INDIAN DEFENDANTS
Julia M. Bedell*
Introduction
At oral argument for Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians,1 Chief Justice John Roberts twice asked the Mississippi Choctaw’s
counsel if it would violate due process for a non-Indian defendant to be
tried by a tribal court jury that consisted solely of tribal members.2 In
response to this question, former Solicitor General Neal Katyal,
representing the Tribe, clarified that the tribal court proceeding at issue was
a bench trial and it was therefore unnecessary to consider jury selection.3
Chief Justice Roberts replied: “I understand that. But it’s kind of a yes-orno question. Does it […] violate due process as a general matter for a
nonmember to be subjected to a jury trial with the jury composed solely of
members of the Tribe?”4
In light of the procedural requirements tribal courts must adopt to assert
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the answer to the Chief Justice’s question is
quite likely, “no.” So long as a tribe can meet the Supreme Court’s test for a
fair jury pool cross-section under Duren v. Missouri,5 tribal courts should
be situated the same as state or federal courts when asserting jurisdiction
* J.D., Columbia Law School, 2016; B.S., Bates College, 2010. The author currently
lives and works in Anchorage, Alaska. She would like to thank the editors of the American
Indian Law Review for their dedication and assistance, as well as the presenters at the 2016
Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference panel on the continuing development of
tribal court criminal jurisdiction, whose comments inspired this writing.
1. Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per
curiam) (upholding the Fifth Circuit’s recognition of the tribal court’s jurisdiction over a tort
claim against Dollar General).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Dollar General, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 131496) (argued Dec. 7, 2015).
3. Id. The underlying case is a tort suit brought in tribal court against Dollar General
and one of its store managers on behalf of a tribal member youth who participated in the
tribe’s Youth Opportunity Program, which places tribal members in unpaid positions at
businesses located within the tribe’s jurisdictional boundaries for educational purposes. The
youth brought a sexual molestation claim against the manager and sued both the manager
and Dollar General in tribal court for $2.5 million in damages. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 2, Dollar General.
4. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2.
5. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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over non-Indians. Therefore, the hypothetical all-tribal-member jury
empaneled in a case involving a non-Indian defendant would likely satisfy
the Court’s requirements to the same extent as would an all-Massachusettsresident, Red Sox-fanatic jury in a Massachusetts state court trial involving
a New York defendant who supports the Yankees.6
Yet this question highlights the unique status of tribal courts as
compared to state and federal courts. Indian tribes are neither foreign
nations, nor are they the equivalent of states.7 As a result, although tribal
courts that now exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants through
the Violence Against Women Act 2013 Reauthorization8 (VAWA) should
theoretically provide fair jury trials as dictated by Supreme Court
precedent, they will also be held to a different standard by federal courts
reviewing such challenges.
In light of such expected scrutiny, this Article reconsiders the fairness of
tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.9 Policymakers tasked
with determining such fairness should consider at least two vantage points:
not only the non-Indian defendant’s right to a fair trial, but also a tribe’s
interest in being able to adequately police and govern its land. The first
consideration has consistently been emphasized and protected by the
Supreme Court. And for good reason: constitutional rights of criminal
defendants are paramount and must be protected in any forum. However,
the second consideration—a tribe’s interest in protecting its land and
people—is no less important. Assuming that tribal courts are found to be
able to provide fair trials to non-Indians,10 Congress should also consider a
6. Justice Breyer made this comparison in oral argument, resulting in much laughter.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 43.
7. Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts' Jurisdiction, 101
CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1501-02 (2013).
8. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (West 2014)).
9. Tribal courts also have limited civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Contract and (Tribal) Jurisdiction, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM, 1, 2 (2016), http:/
/www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/FletcherPDF_xevyxrdi.pdf (“The Court’s working theory,
memorialized in the Montana test, is that Indian nations do not have jurisdiction over
nonmembers, except in two circumstances. One is where nonmember activity is potentially
“catastrophic” to tribal government operations and reservation life. The other is where a
nonmember consents, usually through a commercial transaction, to tribal jurisdiction.”
(footnotes omitted)); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981). Although
criminal and civil jurisdiction should theoretically be consistent, in light of the alreadyestablished bifurcation, this article limits its focus to tribal court criminal jurisdiction.
10. Despite a policy rationale for arguing that tribal courts should be required to satisfy
constitutional due process requirements for Indian defendants as well as for non-Indians,
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tribe’s interest in regaining broader criminal jurisdiction over the many
non-Indians working and living within Indian country when determining
the future scope of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Not only will tribal courts satisfy the legal requirements for a fair jury
trial when exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but
overarching fairness considerations demand that tribal courts be recognized
to have criminal jurisdiction over all non-Indians whom a tribe considers to
be members of a tribe’s community. This jurisdictional definition is a
natural extension of the logic employed in VAWA: tribal courts should
have criminal jurisdiction over certain non-Indians who have demonstrated
sufficient ties to a tribe so as to justify the tribal court’s jurisdiction.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of tribal court systems as they
have developed within Indian country. Part II presents a history of the
Supreme Court’s rhetoric regarding the fairness of tribal court trials to
demonstrate the Court’s focus on protecting non-Indian rights, often at the
expense of tribal court jurisdiction. Part III sets forth the legal requirements
for a fair jury pool composition under Duren v. Missouri and looks to how
tribes have modified their jury selection procedures to meet this standard.
Finally, Part IV considers Indian tribes’ interest in adequately policing its
land and argues that Congress should recognize tribal court criminal
jurisdiction over all non-Indians whom a tribe deems to be part of its
“community.”
I. History of Tribal Court Systems
Tribal courts occupy a unique space in the American legal scheme.11
Indian tribes predate the United States government, yet tribal governments
are not recognized as foreign nations.12 In addition, state laws do not apply
on Indian land.13 Instead, the Supreme Court has held that tribes retain
inherent sovereignty, subject to congressional oversight.14
Consequently, the United States Constitution does not apply to tribal
courts and tribal courts are not bound to provide all of the due process

tribal courts are currently not required to provide the full Bill of Rights to Indian criminal
defendants. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
11. Florey, supra note 7, at 1501-02.
12. Id.
13. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
14. Id.
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protections guaranteed to defendants in state and federal prosecutions.15
Such a situation raises concerns as to whether tribal courts can fairly
adjudicate claims against non-Indians. This part provides a basic overview
of tribal court systems and the lands over which they govern to better
explain the legal and physical contexts in which tribal courts operate.
A. An Overview of Indian Country
The composition of Indian country16 today is relevant to any study on
tribal court fairness in adjudicating claims against non-Indians. It is a
surprising fact that non-Indians currently outnumber Indians within Indian
country: of the 4.6 million people that currently live in Indian country, only
1.1 million identify as Indian.17 This is due partly to the legacy of allotment,
a period of time during which the federal government apportioned tribal
land into parcels and subsequently transferred many of those parcels from
Indians to non-Indians.18 Because of the disorganized nature of this land
transfer, some tribal jurisdictions (such as the Navajo Nation) contain
almost all Indians, yet many others (such as the Port Madison Reservation)
contain a vast majority of non-Indians.19
In addition, as a result of tribal governments’ success in Indian gaming
and other tribal economic development initiatives, many non-Indians work
15. Talton, 163 U.S. at 383-85 (explaining that Congress’s ability to regulate “the
manner in which” local powers of tribal governments are exercised “does not render such
local powers federal powers arising from and created by” the Constitution).
16. “Indian country” is a term of art that encompasses the land on which all Indian
tribes reside. It is defined as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
17. Cynthia Castillo, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, and the Right to an Impartial Jury
After the 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311, 325-26 (2014-2015).
18. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1999)
(“Because of allotment, many reservations today have a significant non-Indian population
and a checkerboard land pattern with non-Indian fee property mixed in with Indian
allotments and collective tribal property.”).
19. Castillo, supra note 17, at 326 (citing Frickey, supra note 18, at 15).
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or reside within Indian country. Indian tribes today collectively employ
hundreds of thousands of American citizens who are not tribal members. 20
Although those employees may not necessarily reside on tribal land, their
employment with tribal governmental entities provides strong links to the
tribes.21
Finally, and largely the reason for enactment of the tribal VAWA
provision, many non-Indians who reside or work in Indian country are
intimately involved with Indians.22 It is not uncommon for non-Indians who
are married to Indians to become eligible for tribal governmental resources
and benefits through their Indian spouses.23
In summary, Indian country today is quite often comprised of more nonIndians than Indians. Although some tribal jurisdictions remain
predominantly closed off from non-Indian populations, the rise in Indian
commerce—most notably, casino gaming—has led to increased
intermingling between Indians and non-Indians.24 It is within this backdrop
that tribal courts operate.
B. Tribal Court Systems
Indian tribes have engaged in community dispute resolution practices
since before the founding of the United States.25 However, Congress has
repeatedly intervened in tribal justice systems pursuant to its plenary
authority over Indian affairs.26 Many modern tribal courts evolved from
courts first established in Indian country by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
20. Matthew Fletcher & Leah Jurss, Tribal Jurisdiction—A Historical Bargain, 76 MD.
L. REV. 593, 594 (2017) (“The 567 federally recognized Indian nations employ hundreds of
thousands of American citizens who are not members of an Indian nation. Indian nations and
nonmember business partners do billions of dollars of business every year. Thousands of
nonmembers lease housing, grazing lands, mineral rights, and other properties from Indian
nations. And many thousands enjoy the benefits of tribal government services, from health
care to social services to public safety protections.”).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 594-95.
23. Id. at 595.
24. See Paul Monies, Indian Gaming Helps Drive Rural Oklahoma Economies, Report
Finds, NEWS OK (July 26, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5557665.
25. See Matthew Fletcher, Anishinaabe Law and The Round House, 10 ALBANY GOV’T
L. REV. 88 (2017) (explaining the Anishinaabe’s traditional forms of law and order that
predate United States legal systems).
26. Federal power to regulate Indian affairs has been determined to derive from the text
and structure of the Constitution: namely, the Indian commerce clause. COHEN’S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.01 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012 ed.) [hereinafter
COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
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during the late nineteenth century as part of an effort to assimilate Indians
into the Anglo-American legal system.27 These “Courts of Indian
Offenses,” commonly known as “CFR courts” because they apply the Code
of Federal Regulations, largely served to assimilate Indians into mainstream
American society.28 Today, fewer than twenty CFR courts remain in
effect.29 Instead, CFR courts have largely been replaced by tribal court
systems.30
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),31
allowing tribes to create and operate their own court systems and to write
their own codes of laws to supplant the Code of Federal Regulations.32
Congress also required tribes to obtain the Department of the Interior’s
approval for the tribes’ laws before being able to replace the CFR.33
Consequently, many tribes simply codified the CFR, or made only slight
adaptations, into their own tribal codes so as to obtain the Department’s
approval.34
Indian tribes predate the United States Constitution and are recognized to
possess inherent tribal sovereignty.35 Because tribal governments are
sovereign nations, the Constitution does not apply to tribal governmental
affairs, and therefore tribal courts are not governed by constitutional due
process requirements.36 Instead, in 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA) that imposed many (though not all) of the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution onto tribal courts and governments.37 As a

27. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE: BUILDING AND SUSTAINING
TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 9 (2005), https://www.
walkingoncommonground.org/files/Background%206%20Pathways_Report_Final.pdf
[hereinafter PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE].
28. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, § 4.04.
29. 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2016).
30. Id.
31. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479).
32. PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 10.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896).
36. Id. at 384-85.
37. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). Congress passed the ICRA in
1968. Previously, the Bill of Rights was found not to apply to Indian tribes. Talton, 163 U.S.
at 384-85; see also Carla Christofferson, Note, Trial Courts' Failure to Protect Native
American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 169 n.4
(1991).
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result of the United States’ intervention, many of the almost 30038 tribal
courts currently in operation resemble state and federal courts in both their
procedural and substantive law.39
However, although many tribal courts currently resemble their state and
federal counterparts, tribal courts have extremely limited jurisdiction over
non-Indians in both the civil and criminal contexts.40 This limited
jurisdiction causes serious law enforcement problems in light of the
composition of Indian country, where only about one-quarter of people
today identify as Indian.41 Despite the presence of many non-Indians within
Indian country, a tribal court most often will not have jurisdiction over
crimes committed by those non-Indians.42
The 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA provided tribal courts with
jurisdiction over non-Indians in the limited context of domestic violence
relationships.43 VAWA recognizes tribes’ inherent power to exercise
“special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” over non-Indians who
commit acts of domestic violence on Indian land against Indian women.44
The VAWA tribal court provision was enacted specifically to combat the
extraordinarily high levels of violence against Indian women and is seen as
a victory for tribal governance and sovereignty.45 Eight tribes participated
38. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 779, 790 n.63 (2015) (“A 2005 report on Indian courts noted that the Bureau of Justice
Assistance had awarded grants to 294 Indian tribes for planning and enhancing their court
systems.”) (citing PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 4).
39. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRIBAL CRIME DATA
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, 2015 (Tech. Report NCJ 248785, July 2015), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tcdca15.pdf; Some tribal courts also apply their own tribal law in
addition to adapted federal and state law. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, § 4.05.
40. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 26, §§ 7.02, 9.04.
41. Castillo, supra note 17, at 325-26.
42. Tribes generally lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians but retain jurisdiction
over “all Indians,” including their own citizens as well as “nonmember Indians.” Neither
Congress nor the federal courts have carefully considered who is included in this category.
Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and Blood, 39 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 337, 340 (2014-2015).
43. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904,
§ 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (West 2014)).
44. VAWA recognizes and affirms “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction”
over non-Indians as part of the inherent jurisdiction of Indian tribes defined in the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Id.
45. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(5), 124
Stat. 2261, 2262 (“It is estimated that 34% of Indian women will be raped in their lifetime
(compared to the nationwide rate of 20%, including Indians.”)); Brief of Amici Curiae
National Indigenous Women's Resource Center and Additional Advocacy Organizations for
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in VAWA’s Pilot Program and many others are now in the process of
implementing this jurisdiction.46
VAWA requires that tribal courts exercising jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants grant such defendants all of the due process protections that the
defendant would receive in state or federal court,47 including the
requirement that the tribe draw jurors from a “fair cross section of the
community” that does not systematically exclude any group, “including
non-Indians.”48 Therefore, in order for tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction
over non-Indian defendants, VAWA essentially requires that the tribal
courts function as would state or federal courts.
II. The Supreme Court’s Rhetoric on Tribal Court Fairness
The Supreme Court’s historical rhetoric on the fairness of tribal court
practices demonstrates the Court’s strong concerns about the fairness of
tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. This part explores the
Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondents at 2-3, Dollar
General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496),
2015 WL 6467637 (“The extraordinary magnitude of violence and sexual assault perpetrated
against Native women and children today constitutes one of the greatest threats to the
integrity and continued existence of Tribal Governments. Native women are more likely to
be battered, raped, or sexually assaulted than any other population in the United States.
Likewise, Native children suffer rates of trauma 2.5 times higher than the national
average.”). In addition, Sen. Al Franken (D-Min.) and Sen. Jon Testor (D.-Mont.) recently
introduced a bill to further extend tribal court jurisdictional over non-Indians who commit
violence against children in Indian country. Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act of
2016, S. 2785, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
46. The tribes currently exercising VAWA 2013 jurisdiction are: Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation; Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation; Eastern Band of Cherokee; Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians;
Pascua Yaqui Tribe; Seminole Nation of Oklahoma; Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake
Traverse Reservation; and Tulalip Tribes. Tribal Implementation of VAWA Pilot Project,
NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-itwg/pilotproject (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
47. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, sec. 904, § 204(d)(4), 127
Stat. at 122. VAWA is carefully crafted to withstand constitutional due process challenges
non-Indian defendants may bring. Although no such challenges have yet been raised,
scholars agree that the statute should withstand due process challenges. See, e.g., Shefali
Singh, Closing the Gap of Justice: Providing Protection for Native American Women
Through the Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction Provision of VAWA, 28
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 220-27 (2014); Castillo, supra note 17, at 332.
48. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, sec. 904, § 204(d)(3), 127
Stat. at 122. This requirement derives from the constitutional standard for jury fairness as
articulated in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/1

No. 2]

FAIRNESS OF TRIBAL COURT JURIES

261

Court’s treatment of tribal courts, focusing in particular on the Court’s
rhetoric on the fairness of tribal court jury trials. The cases presented below
comprise a bulk of federal Indian law and therefore demonstrate the extent
to which such cases may turn on the due process and general fairness
concerns as raised by the Chief Justice in argument for Dollar General.
Understanding these cases, and the Court’s concerns about tribal court
trials, may inform the scrutiny to which tribal courts exercising jurisdiction
over non-Indians are subjected.
The Supreme Court first articulated its mistrust of tribal court systems in
the 1883 case Ex parte Crow Dog, where the Court determined that it was
not fair to try Indians in federal court because of the inequality between
tribal and federal courts.49 Crow Dog, a member of the Brule Sioux, killed
his tribe’s chief, Spotted Tail.50 As punishment for the murder, the tribe
required Crow Dog to provide goods and payment to Spotted Tail’s family
for the remainder of Crow Dog’s life.51 Unhappy with this perceived lack of
justice, the local federal court prosecuted Crow Dog for the murder.52 Crow
Dog was found guilty and the court imposed what it considered a more
appropriate form of justice: the death penalty.53
The Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding that the federal court did
not have jurisdiction over crimes committed between two Indians on Indian
land.54 The Court further explained that, by attempting to exert jurisdiction
over Indians in federal court, the United States was seeking to try Indians
“not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their
land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social
state of which they have an imperfect conception.”55 Such reasoning
expresses the Court’s view of how different from, and unequal to, tribal
courts are to state and federal courts. This decision set the groundwork for

49. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883). The language in Crow Dog is so
offensive to Indians that the Court in subsequent references has shortened its citations,
leaving out the most racist terminology. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 210-11 (1978).
50. Id. at 557.
51. Anthony G. Gulig & Sidney L. Harring, “An Indian Cannot Get A Morsel of
Pork. . . .” A Retrospective on Crow Dog, Lone Wolf, Blackbird, Tribal Sovereignty, Indian
Land, and Writing Indian Legal History, 38 TULSA L. REV. 87, 89 (2002).
52. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
53. Gulig & Harring, supra note 51, at 89.
54. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
55. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
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an argument that racial difference between Indians and non-Indians impacts
the ability for the one to be tried fairly within the other’s court systems.56
The Court inverted this rhetoric in Oliphant, a devastating 1978 decision
that divested tribes of all criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, through an
explanation of why it is unfair for non-Indians to be tried in tribal court.57
The defendants in Oliphant were two non-Indian residents of the Port
Madison Reservation charged by the Suquamish tribe of, respectively,
assaulting a tribal officer and engaging in a high-speed car chase.58 The
Supreme Court agreed to hear their habeas petition and found that the
Suquamish lacked any jurisdiction to try the non-Indian defendants in tribal
court.59 Prefacing its decision, the Court noted one key difference in the due
process provisions afforded in tribal court as compared to federal and state
courts: “Non-Indians, for example, are excluded from Suquamish tribal
court juries.”60 By including this distinction at the outset of its opinion, the
Court framed the petition broadly as an issue of fairness for non-Indians in
tribal courts. Instead of deciding the case narrowly, on the facts for that
tribe’s jury composition and due process concerns, the Court determined
that no tribe may ever exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants.61
56. Congress then reinforced the Crow Dog Court’s rhetoric. Despite the Court’s
deprecation of tribal courts and Indian persons in the Crow Dog decision, the Court did
actually uphold the tribal court decree. Congress then reacted swiftly to this perceived lack
of justice by enacting the Major Crimes Act granting federal courts jurisdiction over all asdefined “major crimes” between Indians on Indian lands. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (2012), undermined tribal criminal justice systems by extending for the first time
federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by Indians against other Indians in Indian country,
an extension justified by the belief that tribal justice systems were not capable of addressing
serious crimes. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 136-39
(1994), Rolnick, supra note 42, at 354 n.55.
57. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
58. Id. at 194.
59. Id. at 195.
60. Id. The Court further explained in a footnote:
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides for “a trial by jury of not less
than six persons,” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10), but the tribal court is not explicitly
prohibited from excluding non-Indians from the jury even where a non-Indian
is being tried. In 1977, the Suquamish Tribe amended its Law and Order Code
to provide that only Suquamish tribal members shall serve as jurors in tribal
court.
Id. at 212 n.4.
61. Id. at 195.
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The Court later cited this reasoning in Duro v. Reina, a 1990 case that
further limited tribes’ criminal jurisdiction to solely members of a tribe. 62
The Court again highlighted the tribe’s member-only jury pool as a bar
against jurisdiction: “[s]ince, as a nonmember, Duro cannot vote in tribal
elections, hold tribal office, or sit on a tribal jury, his relationship with the
Tribe is the same as the non-Indian’s in Oliphant.”63 Here the Court
emphasized a distinction between members and nonmembers of the tribe
instead of between Indians and non-Indians.64 Congress corrected the Duro
decision by enacting a law reinstating tribal court criminal jurisdiction over
all Indians.65 Yet the logic that tribal courts are insular, unfamiliar, and
therefore unfair to outsider defendants, remained.
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,66 a civil case decided in 1997, the Court
considered whether a tribal court was the appropriate forum for a tort suit
brought by Indians against non-Indians for damages from a car crash that
occurred on a state highway within the borders of the Fort Berthold
reservation.67 Near the end of the tribe’s argument, Justice O’Connor asked:
Well, how about if it goes to trial in the tribal court and the tribe
chooses to use as the jury all the friends and relatives of the
victim, and they say, yeah, she’s really been injured, and we’re
going to give a heck of a verdict here, and they do, and suppose
other errors that might amount to a due process violation in a
Federal or State court obtain. There is no way to challenge that
as a due process violation later in any State or Federal court, I
assume.68

62. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
63. Id. at 677. Congress responded to Duro’s further narrowing by providing in statute
that tribal courts do possess criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians (but maintaining
the ban against jurisdiction over non-Indians). Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137,
105 Stat. 646.
64. The Supreme Court generally uses the member-nonmember distinction in civil cases
and the Indian-non-Indian distinction in criminal cases. See Allison M. Dussias,
Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The
Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1993).
65. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 105 Stat. 646.
66. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
67. A-1 Contractors v. Strate, Civ. No. A1-92-24, 1992 WL 696330, at *1 (D.N.D. Sept.
16, 1992).
68. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)
(No. 95-1872).
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Counsel for the tribe disagreed with the Justice and explained that the
Indian plaintiffs would have to proceed through state court in order to
collect any judgment issued in tribal court.69 The state court would then
have full review over the tribal court proceeding and could challenge issues
such as jury composition.70 However, the question of why tribal courts
would be so prejudiced was not addressed. The Court found that the tribal
court did not have jurisdiction.71
The Supreme Court has also expressed generalized fears of tribal court
proceedings outside of jury selection. Justice Souter’s concurrence in
Nevada v. Hicks exemplified the Court’s reasoning:
Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often
from one another) in their structure, in the substantive law they
apply, and in the independence of their judges. Although some
modern tribal courts “mirror American courts” and “are guided
by written codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines,” tribal law is
still frequently unwritten, being based instead “on the values,
mores, and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs,
traditions, and practices,” and is often “handed down orally or by
example from one generation to another” . . . . The resulting law
applicable in tribal courts is . . . unusually difficult for an
outsider to sort out.72
Justice Souter’s opinion represents the Court’s mixture of attempted
respect for tribal court variance yet simultaneous aversion to the asdescribed different, difficult system. In particular, the idea that a non-Indian
would unknowingly be subjected to unfamiliar law and procedure is a
theme within the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence.73
Finally, and most recently prior to Dollar General, the Roberts Court in
its 2008 Plains Commerce decision expressed concern with a tribal court
judgment against a non-Indian bank in various claims resulting from the
bank’s foreclosure action.74 In Plains Commerce, the plaintiffs brought
several claims against the bank in tribal court, including tort, contract, and
discrimination actions. The Supreme Court objected to the tribal court’s
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.
72. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384-85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
73. See, e.g., Fletcher & Jurss, supra note 20, at 594 n.1.
74. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 838.
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issuance of monetary damages and found that such damages rested
improperly upon the discrimination claim:
[t]he jury found against the Bank on three of the special
interrogatories, including number 4, the discrimination claim.
The Bank, the jurors found, “intentionally discriminate[d]
against the Plaintiffs Ronnie and Lila Long.” The jury then
entered an award of $750,000… These facts establish that the
jury could have based its damages award, in whole or in part, on
the finding of discrimination.75
The Court did not decide Plains Commerce based on due process concerns
for the non-Indian defendant. Instead, it held that the tribal court lacked
civil jurisdiction over the claims because non-Indians held the land in
question in fee and therefore, although the land was within the tribe’s
geographic boundaries, it was not tribal land.76 Yet the Court’s dicta is
instructive as to the Court’s general concerns with fairness in tribal court
proceedings.
III. The Fair Cross-Section Jury Requirement in Indian Country
Despite the United States government’s mistrust of tribal court
proceedings presented in Part II above, tribal courts, and particularly those
that exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians, generally operate in accordance
with due process requirements. With regard to jury selection procedures,
many tribes have included non-Indians in their jury pools long before the
passage of VAWA.77 This part presents the constitutional fair-cross section
standard, considers several case studies to illuminate how a non-Indian’s
challenge to a tribal court jury pool would be resolved, and then presents
how the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of southern Arizona, one of the pilot VAWA
tribes, has adapted its jury selection procedures to meet VAWA and
constitutional standards.

75. Plains Comm. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 325 (2008)
(internal citations omitted).
76. Id. at 320.
77. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV.
709, 761 (2006); Castillo, supra note 17, at 328 (“The Navajo Nation not only allows nonIndians to serve on its juries, it even has a procedure in place to ensure than non- Indians are
called to serve.”).
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A. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement
The Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants with the right to
trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.”78 This right has been interpreted to require that jury
pools resemble a “fair cross-section” of the community within which the
court sits and is codified into federal law in the Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968 (JSSA).79
Duren v. Missouri presents the governing test to determine whether a
jury selection pool constitutes a fair cross-section of the community.80 The
three-part test is:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group
in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process.81
In Duren, the Court invalidated a jury selection process that produced a jury
pool containing 15% women in a county where women made up 54% of the
general population.82 Because the disparity between the jury pool and the
population of women in the community was so clear, the Duren Court did
not provide many guidelines beyond the actual test for how subsequent
plaintiffs might successfully challenge their own jury pool schemes.83
The VAWA jury requirements are modeled after the JSSA and Duren
requirements. VAWA specifically requires that tribal courts exercising
jurisdiction over non-Indians provide defendants with juries that satisfy
Duren:
In a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe
exercises special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the
participating tribe shall provide to the defendant . . .
(3) the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from
sources that—
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (2012).
80. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
81. Id. at 364.
82. Id. at 362-63.
83. Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter
Registration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 598 (1990).
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(A) reflect a fair cross section of the community; and
(B) do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in
the community, including non-Indians.84
From the plain language of the VAWA jury requirements, the statute is
designed to provide non-Indian defendants with tribal court juries that
represent a fair cross-section of the community. Therefore, a federal court
evaluating a non-Indian’s challenge to a tribal court jury pool will likely
apply the Duren standard.
However, because of how obvious the underrepresentation was in Duren,
the Court’s reasoning in that case provides particularly little guidance for
plaintiffs bringing fair cross-section challenges on behalf of distinctive
groups who comprise a very small portion of the general population.85
The Supreme Court’s most recent fair cross-section case involved one
such minority group. In Berghuis v. Smith,86 Smith, an African-American,
was convicted in Michigan state court by an all-white jury.87 Smith argued
that African-Americans were underrepresented in his jury selection pool
because African-Americans comprised only 6% of his county’s jury pool
despite representing 7.28% of the county’s adult population.88 The Court
denied the challenge, finding that although the 18% comparative disparity
between the group’s population and representation in jury pools did
constitute sufficient underrepresentation, Smith failed to prove that the
state’s jury selection process systematically excluded African-Americans
under the third Duren prong.89
In addition, Indians almost invariably constitute a very small group
within the jury selection community.90 These cases demonstrate the
difficulty in showing underrepresentation. Consequently, Indians who have
brought fair cross-section challenges when prosecuted in state or federal
courts have faced similar difficulties in showing systematic exclusion.91 In
some cases, Indians have not been able to show that Indians constitute a

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
Etsitty,
1999).

25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(d) (West 2014).
Williams, supra note 83, at 598.
Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 331.
See Washburn, supra note 77, at 729.
See, e.g., United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
130 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.
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“distinctive community” under the first Duren prong.92 Other times, the
challenge has failed because the Indian plaintiff was unable to show that the
underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion by the court system in
question.93 Regardless of which prong the Indian plaintiff failed to satisfy,
the Duren test has not proven to be very useful for Indian plaintiffs
challenging federal and state court jury pool compositions.
Similarly, non-Indians will most likely comprise a small portion of a
tribal community’s population. Therefore, in theory, non-Indians should
face related issues when attempting to challenge their tribal court jury pools
as have Indians who challenge federal and state court jury pools.94
But there are several reasons why non-Indians bringing Duren challenges
may be treated differently than Indians have been. First, ICRA requires that
tribal courts provide defendants with many, but not all, of the substantive
protections provided in the Bill of Rights.95 Consequently, federal courts
scrutinize tribal courts’ practices much more so than they do other federal,
or even state, court practices.
In addition, not all tribes permit non-Indians to become tribal members.96
Because of this, a non-Indian defendant may have no ability to influence a
tribe’s laws. Yet under VAWA, the non-Indian defendant would be entitled
to a jury that does not discriminate against non-Indians.97 Therefore, the
non-Indian would not be able to argue that his or her inability to be a tribal
member bears any relation to the fairness of his or her jury pool.
Consequently, this factor should not affect a Duren challenge.
However, based on past treatment of tribal courts as compared with state
and federal courts, tribes should expect to be treated differently within a
Duren analysis as well. In particular, non-Indians would certainly be able to
show that they represent a “distinctive” group within the community. 98

92. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d at 467.
93. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d at 910; Etsitty, 130 F.3d at 425.
94. See Castillo, supra note 17, at 332.
95. Kevin Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17
FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 210 (2005), http://doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2005.17.3.209. See United
States. v. Bryant, No. 15-420 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (noting that one of the key due process
rights not provided in tribal court is the right to counsel for indigent defendants on trial for
misdemeanors).
96. See Rolnick, supra note 42, at 425 (demonstrating that each tribe has its own
membership requirements, some of which still include blood quantum).
97. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(d) (West 2014).
98. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
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VAWA specifically names non-Indians as persons who cannot be excluded
from tribal court jury rolls, thus defining them as distinctive.99
Furthermore, a non-Indian who goes to trial in front of a jury of all tribal
members appears to raise all of the concerns that have troubled Congress
and the Supreme Court since the beginnings of federal Indian law policy.
Regardless of whether the jury pool included non-Indians and thus satisfied
Duren, a reviewing court may likely still find that such a jury did not
adequately protect the non-Indian defendant’s due process rights.
So long as tribes are considered to be sovereign governments operating
with different concepts of law and justice, tribal courts will continue to face
the scrutiny and mistrust that impedes their ability to regain jurisdiction
over non-Indians. It is for this reason that tribes wishing to exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indians likely should expand their own concepts of
community to better include the non-Indians living and working within the
tribes’ territorial boundaries, so as to hedge against claims of unfairness.
As tribal courts begin to exercise VAWA jurisdiction and effectively
demonstrate that tribal courts are “fair” forums for non-Indians, tribes can
pave the way for expanded jurisdiction over non-Indians to better facilitate
justice within Indian country.
B. The Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s Implementation Process
Tribes that currently exercise VAWA jurisdiction have made the
necessary changes to include non-Indians within the community in the
tribes’ jury selection processes.100 Because of differences between tribal
99. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(d).
100. Fulfilling the requirement that juries expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction under the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 must represent a “fair cross section
of the community,” tribal courts have altered their tribal codes to include non-Indians within
jury pools. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
sec. 904, § 204(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 54, 122 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(1) (West
2014)); FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 6, ch. 5 § 507(b)(1), (c)-(d)
(requiring the juror list for special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction include fifty tribal
members and fifty non-tribal members, randomly summoning twenty-one individuals and
choosing six); SISSETON-WAHPETON OYATE CODES OF LAW ch. 23, § 23-10-03, -04, -05
(compiling a potential juror list that includes tribal members, residents within the tribe’s
jurisdictional boundaries, full time employees of the tribe, and individuals leasing tribal
lands); PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE, 3 PYTC 2-1-160 (pulling potential jurors from tribal
members, individuals living in tribal housing, and anyone working for the tribe); TULALIP
TRIBAL CODES ch. 2.05, § 110 (creating a potential juror list from tribal members and
employees of the tribe’s casino and Quil Ceda Village, then referencing census data to
ensure it reflects a fair cross-section); CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN
RESERVATION, CRIMINAL CODE AND PROCEDURES ch. 3, § 3.19 (using county voter
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court systems, each tribe must figure out its own means of incorporating the
VAWA jury requirements to its existing system. Some tribes exercising
VAWA jurisdiction employ different jury selection procedures for VAWA
and non-VAWA cases, limiting jury service in non-VAWA cases to tribal
members.101 Yet other tribes include non-Indians with ties to the tribal
community, such as non-Indians who live or work in Indian country, in all
jury selection pools.102
The Pascua Yaqui Tribe is an example of one tribe that had to change its
jury selection practices in order to satisfy the VAWA requirements. The
Yaqui was one of three tribes to first exercise enhanced VAWA
jurisdiction. Yaqui courts have been working through jury selection issues
since February 2014.103 In addition, the Yaqui have been active in the
Intertribal Technical-Assistance Working Group on Special Domestic
Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (ITWG), a group that develops and shares
registration lists to find and summon potential jurors from any resident of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation, regardless of tribal membership); Fletcher & Jurss, supra note 20, at 615
n.117.
101. See 6 FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE § 507(b)(1) (defining
eligible juror in VAWA 2013 prosecution as any resident within the boundaries of the Fort
Peck Reservation age of eighteen or over, regardless of race or tribal citizenship not
otherwise disqualified under Court standards, and defining eligible juror in non-VAWA
2013 prosecution as a tribal member who is at least eighteen years old, “is of sound mind an
discretion, has never been convicted of a felony, is not a member of the Tribal Council, or a
judge, officer or employee of the court or an employee of the Reservation police or
Reservation jail, and is not otherwise disqualified according to standards established by the
Court”); Jordan Gross, Let the Jury Fit the Crime: Increasing Native American Jury Pool
Representation in Federal Judicial Districts Within Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction,
77 MONT. L. REV. 281, 302 (2016).
102. See e.g., CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION CRIM.
CODE § 3.19(A) (as amended by Resolution No. 14-018, Mar. 24, 2014) ("[A]ny resident
within the boundaries of the Umatilla Indian Reservation of the age of 18 or over is eligible
to be a juror regardless of race or tribal citizenship."); LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE
TULALIP TRIBE § 1.11.2 (stating that jurors "shall be chosen from the following classes of
persons: 1) tribal members living on or near the Tulalip Indian Reservation; 2) residents of
the Tulalip Indian Reservation; and 3) employees of the Tulalip Tribes or any of its
enterprises, agencies, subdivisions, or instrumentalities who have been employed by the
Tribes for at least one continuous year prior to being called as a juror"); Gross, supra note
101, at 302.
103. See generally ALFRED URBINA & MELISSA TATUM, CONSIDERATIONS IN
IMPLEMENTING VAWA’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND
TLOA’S ENHANCED SENTENCING AUTHORITY: A LOOK AT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PASCUA
YAQUI TRIBE (Oct. 2014), http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/getting-started/Practical_Guide_
to_Implementing_VAWA_TLOA_letter_revision_3.pdf.
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best practices in how tribes should implement the VAWA requirements.104
In May 2017, the Yaqui obtained the first jury trial conviction of a nonIndian defendant pursuant to VAWA jurisdiction.105
The Pascua Yaqui reside on land outside of the city of Tucson, in
southern Arizona. Approximately 500 of the 5000 people living within
Yaqui jurisdictional boundaries identify as non-Indian.106 The primary
employers on Yaqui land are the tribal government and the two tribal
government-run casinos: the Casino of the Sun and Casino del Sol.107
Prior to exercising VAWA jurisdiction, Yaqui courts obtained jurors
from an electronic database containing the names of all persons over the
age of eighteen enrolled in the tribe.108 In order to meet the VAWA jury
requirements, the Yaqui had to expand this database to contain all persons
within their “community,” including non-Indians.109 The tribe consequently
went through the process of determining what constitutes such a
community, taking stock of the many non-Indians who work and live on
Yaqui land.
The tribe contacted the Pascua Yaqui Casino Human Resources office
and the Yaqui Government Human Resources office to obtain lists of all
non-Yaqui employees working for the casinos and the Yaqui
government.110 In addition, the Yaqui court system asked the tribal housing
office for a list of non-Yaqui tribal housing residents and the tribal
enrollment office for a list of tribal members’ non-Indian spouses.111 The
Yaqui court system added all of these persons to its jury selection pools.112
Through this process, the Yaqui determined that 610 of the
approximately 1,600 casino employees were non-Indian, 189 of the almost
104. Tribal Implementation of VAWA: Resource Center For Implementing Tribal
Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, http://
www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-itwg/about-itwg (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
105. First Non-Indian Jury Trial Conviction in Indian Country Prosecuted at Tucson,
Arizona's Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (May 23, 2017), http://www.
prnewswire.com/news-releases/first-non-indian-jury-trial-conviction-in-indian-countryprosecuted-at-tucson-arizonas-pascua-yaqui-tribal-court-300462521.html.
106. URBINA & TATUM, supra note 103, at 32.
107. Fire Department, PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE, http://www.pascuayaqui-nsn.gov/index.
php/fire-department (last visited July 14, 2017).
108. Email from Alfred Urbina, Attorney General, Pascua Yaqui Tribe, to author (Sept.
29, 2016) (on file with author).
109. See URBINA & TATUM, supra note 103, at 7.
110. Email from Alfred Urbina, supra note 108.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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900 tribal government employees were non-Indian, and nine non-Indians
lived in tribal housing.113 In addition, thirty non-Indian spouses were
registered with the enrollment office.114 The Yaqui were therefore able to
add almost 900 non-Indians to its jury pools—a number that reflects the
sizable presence of non-Indians employed by the Yaqui government and
enterprises.
The Yaqui also considered how and if they could enforce jury service
summonses on these non-Indians despite generally having no civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe.115 Because all of the non-Indians
added to the Yaqui jury pool have some tie to the tribe, either through
employment, housing, or marriage, the Yaqui determined that they could
possibly enforce jury service through contract and civil penalties based on
the non-Indian’s particular relationship with the tribe.116 Such an
arrangement would hedge against the potential issue of the tribe not having
any enforcement mechanisms against non-members because of the limited
scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members.117
But a tribe’s lack of legal ability to enforce non-Indian jury service
should not by itself constitute a breach of the Duren standard. So long as a
tribal court summons a non-Indian and the non-Indian has the ability to
accept such a summons, the tribal court has fulfilled its duty.118 If nonIndians never appeared for a tribal court’s jury duty, then the court’s
selection process may be found to be inadequate. Until such a situation
arises, tribal courts should be protected under Duren so long as they are
able to serve non-Indians with summonses despite having no civil or
criminal remedies available in the event that the non-Indian fails to respond.
In summary, tribal courts exercising jurisdiction under VAWA should, in
theory, be able to provide non-Indian defendants with constitutionally fair
jury trials. Congress has imposed the requisite due process protections on
tribal court proceedings, and tribes are taking care to implement these
protections.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Fletcher, supra note 9 (“The Court’s working theory, memorialized in the
Montana test, is that Indian nations do not have jurisdiction over nonmembers, except in two
circumstances. One is where nonmember activity is potentially “catastrophic” to tribal
government operations and reservation life. The other is where a nonmember consents,
usually through a commercial transaction, to tribal jurisdiction.”); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981).
116. Email from Alfred Urbina, supra note 108.
117. See Fletcher, supra note 9.
118. Castillo, supra note 17, at 332.
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However, because the jurisdiction granted by VAWA is nevertheless
insufficient to address current problems with law enforcement in Indian
country, Congress should consider a further expansion of tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians under a “community recognition standard” as
articulated in this next part.
IV. The Fairness of Indian Tribes’ Right to Govern
In light of tribal courts regaining some, albeit quite limited, jurisdiction
over non-Indians through VAWA, it is appropriate to once again step back
and consider the fairness implications of tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndians more broadly.119 A tribal court is one of the few jurisdictions that
does not possess geographic, or territorial, jurisdiction over every person
who enters the tribe’s geographic boundaries.120 Therefore, unlike when an
American commits a crime in Canada and the American is subject to
Canadian law despite the fact that the American is not a Canadian citizen,
non-Indians may commit crimes in Indian country and use the defense of
not being a member of the Indian tribe to bar the tribal court’s
jurisdiction.121 Such an arrangement is arguably unfair on its face to the
tribal governments attempting to regulate their lands.
There is a fundamental tension between a tribe’s right to have territorial
jurisdiction over its lands and the unique relationship between Indian tribal
governments and the United States. Because tribes will likely never be
recognized by the United States as separate sovereign nations, there is
119. The idea that tribes should retain jurisdiction over tribal lands is not a new one.
Scholars have called for Congress and/or the Supreme Court to recognize an expansion of
tribal court jurisdiction for years. See, e.g., Alison Burton, What About the Children?
Extending Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction to Crimes Against Children, 52 HARVARD CIVIL
RIGHTS – CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 193 (2017); Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions:
Overcoming the Jurisdictional Maze to Protect Native American Women from Sexual
Violence, 11 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 3 (2009); Amy Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and
Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1277-78 (2004); Frickey, supra, note 18, at 1.
120. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he general
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); David Wolitz,
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: Toward Bounded Pluralism, 91 OREGON L. REV.
725, 730 (2012) (“The doctrine of territoriality—according to which criminal jurisdiction is
determined by the territorial location of the crime—seems to answer most questions about
which criminal justice system has jurisdiction over which crimes.”); see Rolnick, supra note
42, at 338.
121. See Rolnick, supra note 42.
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perhaps a need for an “intermediate” form of territorial and membershipbased sovereignty. Under such a model, tribal governments could better
control Indian country without violating the due process rights of nonIndians and other non-tribal members.
Critical race theorist and Indian law scholar Addie Rolnick has created
one such model that she calls a “community recognition standard.”122 Under
this standard, tribes should have criminal jurisdiction over “anyone who is
recognized by the tribe as a member of the community.”123 This definition
allows tribes to maintain whatever requirements they may have for tribal
membership, some of which include blood quantum, while also assimilating
non-Indians whom they feel are part of their greater community into tribal
court proceedings as jury members.124 The community recognition standard
is a hybrid between the geographic and membership-based conceptions of
jurisdiction that have defined past federal Indian law jurisprudence.125 Such
a hybrid model more accurately reflects the unique status of Indian tribes
within American law than does either a purely geographic or purely
membership-based conception of jurisdictional power.
Rolnick’s model presents a logical outgrowth of VAWA jurisdiction. By
enacting VAWA, Congress recognized the need for tribal courts to
adjudicate claims against non-Indians, but only in those specific instances
where the non-Indian defendant has demonstrated close ties to the tribe or
to tribal members.126 Expanding this logic, there are many more instances
when tribal courts can—and should—exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians
who have close ties to the tribe’s community. For example, the Tribal
Youth and Community Protection Act, a bill presented to Congress in 2016,
would expand tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit acts of

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 423-24.
See Dussias, supra note 64.
25 U.S.C.A. § 1304(b)(4)(b) (West 2014).
A participating tribe may exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant—
(i) resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe;
(ii) is employed in the Indian country of the participating tribe; or
(iii) is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of—
(I) a member of the participating tribe; or
(II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the participating
tribe.

Id.
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domestic violence against children.127 There could foreseeably be many
more instances where a non-Indian displays sufficient ties to a tribal
community to be properly held in tribal court despite not having tribal
membership.
The community recognition standard allows a tribe, as authorized by a
required future act of Congress, to determine whether or not to exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indians. This is a fair distribution of power: Congress
and the Supreme Court have already set the requirements tribal courts must
meet in order to exercise jurisdiction.128 It should then be the tribes who are
granted the option of determining whether they can meet those standards,
just as is the case with the VAWA jurisdiction.
In addition, the community recognition standard accurately reflects the
composition of most of Indian country today.129 It seems particularly unfair
that tribal courts are not sufficiently able to adjudicate crimes committed
within Indian country just because a majority of persons physically residing
in Indian country do not identify as Indians. Because Congress’ attempt to
confer criminal jurisdiction to state and federal governments has generally
shown to be ineffective in combating crime, tribal courts are arguably the
best-situated forums to adjudicate these claims.130
Therefore, when the Court invariably hears its first fair cross-section
challenge brought by a non-Indian convicted in tribal court, it should
conduct a two-part fairness analysis: First, it should ensure that the
defendant was provided a fair jury under the Duren standard. And second,
particularly because it is so difficult to prove these fair cross-section claims
when the population in question represents a small group within the
jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from applying its historical analysis as
to tribal court fairness.
It is clear that the status quo, where tribal courts retain extremely little
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, has not been effective in combating
127. Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act of 2016, S. 2785, 114th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2016). The VAWA only allows for jurisdiction against non-Indians who commit acts
of domestic violence against other adults.
128. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); see supra Parts I and II.
129. See supra Part I.
130. Rolnick, supra note 42, at 349-50 (“Within Indian country, the federal government
exercises jurisdiction over crimes between Indians and non-Indians and certain enumerated
major crimes involving only Indians. In some areas, states exercise Indian country criminal
jurisdiction in place of the federal government pursuant to Public Law 280 or a similar
law.”) (citing the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); Public Law 280, Act of Aug.
15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 25 U.S.C.)).
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crime in Indian country.131 One reason for why the status quo is inadequate
is that criminal law is intended to be local in nature.132 Yet, in Indian
country, the local court is almost always the tribal court and the tribal court
invariably will not have jurisdiction if the perpetrator of the crime is not
Indian.
The current solution is for the federal government, or occasionally for
state governments, to prosecute those crimes that a tribal government
cannot.133 But even putting aside practical considerations such as the federal
government’s lack of funding for Indian country prosecutions or lack of
interest in prosecuting crimes that often take place in rural and remote
areas, having the federal government handle routine Indian country crimes
simply does not make sense.134 Federal courthouses, prosecutors, and law
enforcement officers are rarely located near the scene of the crime. 135 This
geographic distance makes going to trial burdensome for all parties
involved and over time can result in a perversion of justice.136
Consequently, most Indian law scholars and policymakers agree that the
current model is insufficient for addressing crime within Indian country.
Perhaps the most obvious alternative to the status quo would be for tribes
to regain full criminal jurisdiction over all persons within a tribe’s
geographic boundaries. Not only would this solution clarify criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country, it would also recognize the sovereignty of
tribal governments. Tribes would then have the same criminal jurisdiction
over tribal lands as do state governments over state geographic boundaries.
It is important to note that no Indian law scholars advocate outright for
such territorial jurisdiction—likely because such an idea is untenable in
light of current federal Indian law and policy.137 Even the small, carefully
crafted amount of jurisdiction granted to tribes under VAWA has caused

131. See STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002, at 5 (2004),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf; Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-211, § 202(a)(5), 124 Stat. 2261, 2262.
132. Washburn, supra note 77, at 713.
133. Id. at 712. On some reservations in so-called Public Law 280 states, state
governments are tasked with Indian country law enforcement. See generally Carole E.
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22
UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975); Washburn, supra note 77, at 712 n.13.
134. Washburn, supra note 77, at 713.
135. Id. at 712.
136. Id. at 712-14.
137. See supra Part II.
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some concerns within the legal community.138 Instead, persuasive
scholarship has largely focused on highlighting flaws in the current system
and offering some potential solution in the abstract.139
Therefore, the community recognition standard is currently the most
realistic, yet impressively aspirational, standard offered to replace the status
quo. This standard acknowledges the complicated history between Indian
tribes and the United States, as well as the delicacy involved in Indian law
advocacy, and limits tribal criminal jurisdiction to only those non-Indians
whom the tribe believes have demonstrated adequate ties to the tribe. At the
same time, the community recognition standard also places some power
back into the hands of tribal governments by allowing tribes to define their
communities, and thus the extent of their jurisdiction, within boundaries set
by Congress and the Supreme Court.
In addition, this standard builds logically upon VAWA. VAWA created
the framework for considering ties between a tribe and certain non-Indians
by granting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian perpetrators of
intimate domestic violence against tribal members. This format can
certainly be expanded to eventually reach all non-Indians with whom the
tribe has a relationship.
The community recognition standard presents tribal policymakers with a
guideline for how to advocate for continued expansion of tribal criminal
jurisdiction through successive legislative grants instead of through courtmade law. It is a guideline for where tribal criminal jurisdiction should be
headed so long as tribes can demonstrate their abilities to provide nonIndians with fair trials.
It may be difficult for tribes to show that they can fairly adjudicate
claims against non-Indians. As seen in Part II, the Supreme Court has long
articulated concerns about the differences between tribal court practices and
state and federal court practices. However, the community recognition
standard acknowledges that some non-Indians have demonstrated sufficient
ties to the tribal community to effectively be put on notice as to the tribal
court’s jurisdiction.
Provided that tribal courts afford all defendants, including non-Indians,
with fair trials as mandated by the United States Constitution, it is
138. See e.g., Thomas F. Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should NonIndians Be Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, ENGAGE, July 2012, at 40,
http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/20120806_GedeEngage13.2.pdf.
139. See e.g., Katharine C. Oakley, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177 (2010-2011); Washburn, supra note 77;
Dussias, supra note 64.
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additionally fair to restore a tribal court’s criminal jurisdiction over all
persons within that tribe’s community: Indians and non-Indians alike. With
time, perhaps this model will come to describe the state of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country.
V. Conclusion
As demonstrated in Part II above, the Supreme Court has long discussed
the fairness concern of subjecting non-Indians to the sometimes-unfamiliar
practices and procedures of tribal court systems. The Court has
subsequently chosen to privilege non-Indian defendants’ rights, often at the
expense of the tribal government’s ability to regulate its land and its people.
Although Indian tribes face considerable obstacles before they can
convince Congress and the Supreme Court of their fitness to adjudicate
claims against non-Indians in tribal court, the changing composition of
Indian country may help alter the course of tribal court jurisdiction in the
public mind. So far, Supreme Court rhetoric has reflected American
society’s wariness of tribal justice systems. But as more non-Indians live
and work within Indian country, and as tribes gain recognition in modern
society, fears of tribal court unfairness may begin to lessen. Such societal
change may influence federal court review of tribal court practices.140
Therefore, in light of the competing fairness concern for tribes to be able
to adequately police their land, Congress should recognize tribal courts’
jurisdiction over all non-Indians within a tribe’s community, however the
particular tribe chooses to define this term, so as to better reflect the
changing populations in Indian country. Such a jurisdictional grant should
likely survive judicial review, despite current precedent.

140. See e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1975,
1979 (2015) (“‘Judges are human,’ wrote [Felix] Cohen, ‘but they are a peculiar breed of
humans, selected to a type and held to service under a potent system of government
controls. . . . A truly realistic theory of judicial decisions must conceive every decision as
something more than an expression of individual personality, as . . . a product of social
determinants.’”) (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843 (1935)).
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